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Synthetic biology is a rapidly
emerging interdisciplinary ﬁeld of
science and engineering that aims
to redesign living systems through
reprogramming genetic informa-
tion. The ﬁeld has catalysed global
debate among policymakers and
publics. Here we describe how
synthetic biology relates to these
international deliberations, particu-
larly the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD).Synthetic biology or engineering biology
is a fast-moving ﬁeld that embraces and
drives state-of-the-art technologies for
designing and reconstructing livings sys-
tems at different scales, primarily by
reprogramming cellular genetic informa-
tion. As such, the ﬁeld has catalysed
global debate among the wider circles of
legislative policymakers, including multiple
international conventions, treaties, and
protocols. Various international treaties
and organisations are currently examining
the impacts of synthetic biology and
engineered gene drive systems on their
respective agreements (Table 1). One
main United Nations (UN) convention of
importance to synthetic biology is the
UN Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD). In simple terms, the CBD has
three main objectives: (i) conservation of
biological diversity, (ii) sustainable use ofits components, and (iii) fair and equitable
sharing of beneﬁts arising from the use of
genetic resources. Since 2010, the CBD
has discussed whether synthetic biology
should be classiﬁed as a new and emerg-
ing issue and its objectives and activities
are of considerable importance to the syn-
thetic biology research community. For
example, one objective of the CBD is to
grant sovereign rights of countries over
their genetic resources. Furthermore, the
CBD is also deliberating whether or not
new/adapted regulations are needed for
synthetic biology, how access and bene-
ﬁts sharing agreements (ABS) should be
managed with digital sequence informa-
tion (DSI) and also whether or not morato-
riums on synthetic biology research and/or
applications to the environment should be
implemented (Table 1). The CBD is also
debating whether the products of syn-
thetic biology should be considered
under the convention, in addition to the
process or technology used to produce
them. The synthetic biology community
should follow these deliberations closely
and take the opportunity to engage di-
rectly within these processes.
In addition, similar deliberations have been
underway inside the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the
world’s largest and most diverse environ-
mental network. IUCN commissioned a
broad assessment addressing mandates
established at its 2016 IUCN World Con-
servation Congress: ‘Development of
IUCN Policy on Biodiversity Conservation
and Synthetic Biology’ (WCC-2016-Res-
086). This assessment has recently been
released [1].
In 2016, the Parties to the Nagoya Proto-
col adopted decision XIII/16, which
established a science and policy-based
process on DSI and genetic resources
[Decision XIII/16 Adopted by the Confer-
ence of the Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity. Digital SequenceInformation on Genetic Resources (2016).
Available at https://www.cbd.int/doc/
decisions/cop-13/cop-13-dec-16-en.pdf;
CBD synbio online forum can be found at
https://bch.cbd.int/synbio/open-ended/
discussion/]. Following the results of
this process in 2018, the Parties to the
Nagoya Protocol adopted decision 14/20
[Decision 14/20. Adopted by the Confer-
ence of the Parties to the Convention
on Biological Diversity. Digital Sequence
Information on Genetic Resources (2018)
https://www.cbd.int/abs/dsi-gr/2019-
2020/default.shtml]. This process entails
the submission of views and information,
the commissioning and peer review of
four studies, and work by an expert
group on how to address DSI on genetic
resources in the context of the post-2020
global biodiversity framework. Over the
next few years, these will be important
decision-making processes for the syn-
thetic biology community to observe and
participate in, as the CBD and International
Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture negotiate issues
surrounding both DSI and ABS.
These policies could have a signiﬁcant in-
ﬂuence on synthetic biology research and
development internationally. For example,
implementation of active ABS policies on
genetic information could inhibit global
commercialisation of public-funded re-
search or promote ‘get-arounds’ to avoid
ABS, both of which are not ideal scenar-
ios. The policies could also fundamentally
challenge the very nature and ethics of
biological diversity, raising practical issues
around ABS and risk assessment proto-
cols. They also could lead to a moratorium
on developing synthetic biology applica-
tions like gene drive (see below and
Table 1).
Key Issue 1: Ownership (ABS/DSI)
The International Treaty for Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture
(Plant Treaty) and the Nagoya ProtocolTrends in Biotechnology, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 1
Table 1. International Legal Frameworks of Relevance to Synthetic Biologya
Instrument Description Relevance for synthetic biology
UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
https://www.cbd.int/
Adopted: 1992
Entered into force: 1993 Parties: 196
Global legal framework addressing conservation,
sustainable use, and sharing of beneﬁts of
biodiversity. Creates obligations for each Party
(Countries that have signed onto the Convention) to
manage risks associated with living modiﬁed
organisms (LMOs) that could have a negative
impact on biological diversity [article 8(g)]. These
obligations are captured, in part, under the
Cartagena Protocol described below. Additional
frameworks/requirements that address access and
beneﬁts sharing of genetic resources is also
captured under the CBD and are described below
(i.e., Nagoya Protocol).
Decision XII/24 established an ad hoc technical
expert group (AHTEG) on synthetic biology that has
produced multiple reports and recommendations
but has not as yet undertaken the robust
assessment against new and emerging criteria as
mandated by the Conference of the Parties [6].
These deliberations continue and have since added
gene drives and genome editing to their mandate.
Since 2010, the CBD has discussed whether
synthetic biology, which now includes gene drives
and, potentially, gene editing, should be classiﬁed
as a new and emerging issue. Deﬁning it as such
would enable the development of new guidance
and risk assessments on how synthetic biology and
its applications (separate from LMOs) could be
utilised in the future by a member state. For
synthetic biology researchers, this could result in
limitations or even stopping research into some
potential synthetic biology applications; there is a
need to be aware of the origin/source of the genetic
information they are using in their research, with
potential limitations on commercialisation of some
synthetic biology applications.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the




Entered into force: 2003 Parties:171
Protocol under the CBD intended to ensure the
‘safe transfer, handling and use of LMOs resulting
from modern biotechnology that may have adverse
effects on biological diversity...’ (article 1). It requires
sharing of risk-related information between
exporting and importing Parties and provides
guidelines on methodologies for conducting
environmental risk assessments and considerations
in decision making.
Current deliberations are considering whether or
not synthetic biology, including engineered gene
drives, would fall under the deﬁnitions of LMOs and
thus be subject to the risk assessment
requirements of the Cartagena Protocol [7]. For
synthetic biology researchers, note that the issues
surrounding the classiﬁcation of LMOs in relation to
speciﬁc genome edits versus transgenes versus
completely recoded synthetic genomes remains
unresolved within the convention. In 2019 a study
was commissioned to gather information from
areas where LMOs containing engineered gene
drives are produced and/or are expected to be
used for either ﬁeld testing or release, and any
issues related to challenges for existing risk
assessment methodologies and guidelines to
assess the safety of LMOs containing engineered
gene drives.
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol
on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety (Supplementary Protocol)
https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/supplementary/
Adopted: 2010
Entered into force: 2018 Parties: 42
Supplementary Protocol to Cartagena Protocol
intended to provide rules and procedures for liability
and redress relating to LMOs. Provides for national
frameworks requiring response measures and
assigning civil liability in event of damage resulting
from LMOs that ﬁnd their origin in transboundary
movement.
Whether synthetic biology is classiﬁed as a new and
emerging issue or is captured under the current
LMO deﬁnitions under the Cartagena Protocol, the
synthetic biology community would be held under
the rules of this Protocol, pursuant to the member
state in which they are operating. For the synthetic
biology researcher, any accidental or deliberate
release of an LMO that causes damage, the
researcher/institution would be held as liable under
the convention.
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable sharing of
Beneﬁts Arising from their Utilization to the




Entered into force: 2014
Parties: 105
The Nagoya Protocol is an international legal
agreement for the fair and equitable sharing of the
beneﬁts [access and beneﬁt sharing (ABS)] arising
from sustainable utilisation of genetic resources to
conserve and protect biodiversity.
Applies to genetic resources that serve as source
material for synthetic biology research.
Creates ABS framework based on traceability and
transfer of material that could be undermined by
use of digital sequence information. In 2017 the
secretariat of the CBD commissioned a report
examining the impacts of digital sequence
information as it relates to the Nagoya Protocol [8].
The study found that the use of information on
genetic resources, including in synthetic biology,
could create opportunities for new forms of
nonmonetary and monetary beneﬁt sharing for the
Trends in Biotechnology
2 Trends in Biotechnology, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx
Table 1. (continued)
Instrument Description Relevance for synthetic biology
owners of genetic resources but noted the risk that
DSI would undermine existing approaches to
beneﬁt-sharing by avoiding the need for access to
genetic resources themselves [8]. Deliberations on
this topic continue. For the synthetic biology
researcher, policy developments around DSI could
affect their ‘freedom to operate’.
International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA)
http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty
Adopted: 2001
Entered into force: 2004
Parties: 145
International regime recognising sovereign rights
over plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture. The treaty facilitates access to the
genetic material of the 64 crops in the multilateral
system for research, breeding, and training for food
and agriculture. Those who access the materials
must be from the treaty’s ratifying nations and they
must agree to use the materials totally for research,
breeding, and training for food and agriculture.
The treaty prevents the recipients of genetic
resources from claiming intellectual property rights
over those resources in the form in which they
received them, and ensures that access to genetic
resources already protected by international
property rights is consistent with international and
national laws. Those who access genetic materials
through the multilateral system agree to share any
beneﬁts from their use through four beneﬁt-sharing
mechanisms established by the treaty.
It is currently unclear how the technological change
occurring in synthetic biology that is enabling the
manufacture, manipulation, and use of genomic
sequence data should be considered under the
ITPGRFA. Although the treaty addresses ABS for
physical material it does not take an ABS approach
for genetic data.
The evolving technological, legal, and institutional
context surrounding the exchange and use of DSI
for synthetic biology and genomic research may
affect ABS frameworks under the ITPGRFA. The
availability of sequence data through decentralised
data libraries and organisations may challenge the
multilateral system set up by the ITPGRFA. Other
factors, including partial sequence combinations,
and the fact that the same sequence may occur in
multiple organisms, further challenge the ABS
principles. For the synthetic biology researcher,
policy developments around ABS could affect their
‘freedom to operate’.




Entered into force: 1975 Parties: 183
Multilateral environmental agreement establishing
regulations and permitting system covering trade in
listed species.
CITES has begun discussions related to synthetic
biology products that substitute or resemble
products from a CITES listed species in
international trade (e.g., synthetic rhino horn or
other ivory products). CITES is also examining what
the status of a genetically modiﬁed species, a
completely novel species, or a de-extinction spe-
cies would be under the Convention. For example,
would a ‘new’ species or a de-extinction species
created though synthetic biology be given the same
protections under CITES.
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
https://www.un.org/depts/los/
Adopted: 1982
Entered into force: 1994 Parties: 168
Codiﬁcation of law of the sea, including activities
and resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Provides basis for ongoing negotiation of
international agreement on marine biodiversity in
areas beyond national jurisdiction, including sharing
of beneﬁts from marine genetic resources.
While these discussions are in the early stages,
issues around ABS, ownership, and protections are
similar to the negotiations/discussions currently
underway in the CBD, Nagoya, CITES, and
ITPGRFA. It could have an impact on genetic
resources that could serve as source material for
synthetic biology research. For the synthetic biology
researcher, policy developments around the
availability and usage of genetic resources could
affect their ‘freedom to operate’.
aAdapted from [1].
Trends in Biotechnologyhave begun to examine the broad themes
and potential implications of synthetic biol-
ogy and genomic research; speciﬁcally,
how evolving technological, legal, and
institutional contexts surrounding the ex-
change and use of DSI affects its ABS
frameworks.Science and Technology Dimensions
The recent report commissioned by the
Plant Treaty has a number of key ﬁndings
[2]. There are three main broad themes:
(i) mining plant genomic information for
gene editing in agriculture, (ii) mining for
use outside of agriculture, and (iii) usingthe plant as a ‘workhorse’ to produce
other products. A large amount of DNA
sequence data is already widely available
and easily exchanged, which raises signiﬁ-
cant challenges to the ABS logic of identiﬁ-
cation and the different expectations of
monitoring.With new genetic technologies,Trends in Biotechnology, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 3
Box 1. Gene Drives
A gene drive is a system of biased inheritance where the ability of a genetic element to pass from a parent
organism to its offspring through sexual reproduction is enhanced. Unlike the population dynamics of normal
genomic alterations, gene drive systems promote the spread of genetic elements through populations by
ensuring inheritance at a higher frequency than Mendelian segregation would predict [9]. Of particular rele-
vance is the Cas9-mediated gene drive study of the malaria vector mosquitoes Anopheles stephensi and
Anopheles gambiae showing potential as an intervention in malaria control [9]. Cas9-mediated gene drives
have also been demonstrated in mice [10]. Whilst this technique has potential to address global problems in
health, agriculture, and conservation, the capacity to alter wild populations outside the laboratory has caused
signiﬁcant concerns [11,12]. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that any self-propagating system has multiple
biocontainment strategies in place to minimise any risk of contamination of natural biodiversity.
Trends in Biotechnologythe ABS system cannot rely on the link
between physical material and data to
identify ownership and location, so moni-
toring DSI exchange is very challenging.
Other complications are the use of partial
sequence combinations and duplication
of sequences in multiple organisms.
Legal Challenges in ABS
Access to material under the multilateral
system [MLS; Article 12.3(a)] is solely for
purposes of ‘utilization and conservation
for research, breeding and training for
food and agriculture’, and excludes ‘chem-
ical, pharmaceutical and/or other non-
food/feed industrial uses’. Researchers
can effectively use DSI from MLS material
in any kind of research, including chemical
and/or pharmaceutical, without such
usage being easily monitored. Moreover,
by using DSI from identiﬁable published
material, the chain of transmission is not
transparent nor documented, and there
are no indications that legal innovations
such as open material transfer agreements
will improve DSI monitoring or assess ben-
eﬁts. While some patents incorporating DSI
may provide geographic origin information,
others may not, or the information may be
hidden (e.g., trade secret protection).
To encourage equitable sharing and ac-
cess to genetic materials, researchers gen-
erally use ex ante investment to facilitate
access to genetic material, public funding
for infrastructure investment, facilitated ac-
cess for research community building,
structured research collaboration, and
education and training. These strategies
could be considered in relation to the
Nagoya Protocol and Plant Treaty [3], as
both acknowledge the importance of fair
and equitable sharing of beneﬁts arising
from genetic resources, through exchange
of information, access to and transfer of
technology, and capacity-building.
Key Issue 2: Biocontainment
In some cases, synthetic biology applica-
tions could ultimately involve environmental4 Trends in Biotechnology, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xxrelease of livingmodiﬁed organisms (LMOs)
that would interfere with evolution and
natural biodiversity [4] (see below). To ad-
dress this, a number of novel biocontain-
ment strategies have been described,
although their utility is still under debate
[4,5]. Several use auxotrophy, which
limits a cell’s ability to survive in the ab-
sence of deﬁned chemical or nutrients.
Others involve genetic ‘kill-switches’,
which control the viability of cells in re-
sponse to deﬁned internal or external
stimuli. In contrast, physical containment
directly limits contact of LMOs with the
surrounding environment. The release of
LMOs directly into the environment is
a central topic within the CBD. Con-
cerns are based around lack of predict-
able organism behaviour and inﬂuence
on its surroundings. Certain criteria
would need to be met to ensure the
LMO would not restrict or outcompete
native organisms, nor interfere with the
natural evolutionary process. A major
problem is the adaptive response of
living organisms to their environment
where, to survive, cells can evolve es-
cape mechanisms such as mutational
drift or horizontal gene transfer, or ac-
quire essential nutrients from the envi-
ronment [5].
Key Issue 3: Interference with
Evolution
Synthetic biologists directly engage with
molecular evolution, from simple genetic
point mutations to whole gene dele-
tions, additions, and replacement. Morerecently, work has expanded to de
novo genome synthesis as a result of
decreasing DNA costs and the ease of
large-scale DNA assembly (e.g., bacte-
rial genomes and yeast chromosomes).
There are now a range of reverse ge-
netics strategies available in the syn-
thetic biologist’s toolkit, with the gene
drive approach (Box 1) causing particu-
lar concern within the CBD and other
international conventions. Resolution
of these concerns could result in a
moratorium on the release into the en-
vironment of engineered organisms for
speciﬁc applications.
Concluding Remarks
Synthetic biology has the potential to
catalyse a new biotechnology revolution,
but with these opportunities comes a
duty to ensure safety. There is now an
urgent need for scientists, policy makers,
and broader stakeholder communities to
engage with one another to collectively
evaluate and decide how synthetic biol-
ogy research should be conducted,
with the aim of conserving biological
diversity whilst providing beneﬁts to all.
We strongly recommend that the syn-
thetic biology community monitor the
CBD debates, which will include an op-
portunity to review the ﬁndings of the ad
hoc technical expert group of synthetic
biology and participate in future online
forums on synthetic biology and DSI
(refer to the UN Portal on Synthetic
Biology for more information: https://
bch.cbd.int/synbio/).
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